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1. INTRODUCTION
The once well established precept that a U.S. court may only
award judgments in dollarsI no longer holds force as doctrine.
The recent federal court decisions in In re Oil Spill by the Amoco
Cadiz2 and Mitsui & Co. v. Oceantrawl Corp.,3 granting judgments
in foreign currencies, indicate a willingness by courts to look be-
yond the doctrines of the past and formulate rules better suited to
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1 See Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, 189 F.2d 952, 954
(2d Cir. 1951); Frontera Transp. Co. v. Abaunza, 271 F. 199, 202 (5th Cir.
1921); Liebeskind v. Mexican Light & Power Co., 116 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir.
1941); Guinness v. Miller, 291 F. 769, 770-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1923); Suzanne Raggio
Westerheim, Note, The Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act: No Solution to an
Old Problem, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1208 (1991) ("[T]raditional wisdom is that
United States courts are forbidden from giving judgments in anything but
United States dollars."); Paul L. Lion, 1I1, Note, The Need to Retreat From In-
flexible Conversion Rules-An Equitable Approach to Judgment in Foreign Cur-
rency, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 871, 871 (1982).
The source of the often quoted rule has not been well articulated. See Jennifer
Freeman, Judgments in Foreign Currency-A Little Known Change in New York
Law, 23 INT'L LAW. 737, 738-39 (1989). Proffered sources for the rule include
principles of Anglo-American common law, section 20 of the Coinage Act of
1792,31 U.S.C. 5 371,amended by 31 U.S.C. S 5101 (1982), and the natural sov-
ereignty of the forum court. See Guinness, 291 F. at 770; Joseph Becker, The
Currency ofJudgment, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 152, 152, 154 & 158 (1977); Freeman,
supra, at 738-39.
2 954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992).
3 906 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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trans-national legal disputes. Numerous states have seen fit to re-
ject the home-currency rule, which requires that all awards be de-
nominated in dollars, by adopting statutes that require judgments
to be awarded in foreign currency.4  Criticism of the home-
currency rule, though dating back to the early twentieth century,
has recently multiplied.- These factors combined indicate that the
old rule can no longer be depended upon and that alternative ap-
proaches should be given due weight by the courts.
Due to the fluctuating value of national currencies relative to
each other, both the choice of currency and the choice of the date
for determining the rate of currency conversion can significantly
affect the value of an award in terms of a domestic currency.
When a court cannot issue awards in a foreign currency, the court
must specify a conversion rate to determine the domestic cur-
rency equivalent for the foreign money obligation. The three
most commonly suggested dates for setting a conversion rate are:
breach-day-the date money became due; judgment-day-the date
judgment is entered; and payment-day--the date when the obliga-
tion is actually paid. Depending on currency fluctuations, use of
different rules may produce "wildly disparate results in terms of
making the injured person whole."8
The ability to grant an award in foreign currency appears to
resolve much of the complexity surrounding conversion of a for-
eign currency claim into dollars for enforcement by a U.S. court.
4 See UNIF. FOREIGN-MONEY CLAIMS ACT, 551-19 tbl., 13 U.L.A. 60
(West Supp. 1997) [hereinafter UFMCA]. As of 1995, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, the
Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin have all enacted significant
parts of the UFMCA. Id. at 60.
5 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS S 823(1) (1987)
(United States courts are not precluded from giving judgment in the currency
in which the obligation is denominated... ."); see generally Ronald A. Brand,
Restructuring the U.S. Approach to Judgments on Foreign Currency Liabilities:
Building on the English Experience, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 139 (1985) (arguing for a
foreign judgment currency rule to replace the home-currency rule); Joseph
Dach, Conversion of Foreign Money: A Comparative Study of Changing Rules, 3
AM. J. COMP. L. 155 (1954) (surveying currency choice and conversion rules in
America and Europe and fining no compelling reason for the United States to
maintain a home-currency rule).
6 See UFMCA prefatory note at 61; Brand, supra note 5, at 142; Lion, supra
note 1, at 871-72.





However, from the perspective of an injured party the economic
consequence of a foreign currency award is indistinguishable from
the use of a payment-day rule.9 This necessarily follows because
on the day of payment the foreign currency amount will be
equivalent to an amount in domestic currency using the conver-
sion rate for that day. Theoretically, the injured party could ex-
change the foreign currency on the day of payment for the
equivalent dollar amount. Though the amount of the foreign cur-
rency award remains constant, the actual economic value of the
award in terms of domestic currency fluctuates with exchange
rates.10 Because the actual value received by the injured party var-
ies over time, it is necessary to look beneath the apparent simplic-
ity of a foreign currency rule.
The availability of foreign currency judgments broadens the
field of potential remedies! A foreign currency judgment pro-
duces the same economic result as if a payment-day conversion
rate were used. 12 It does not solve the problem of choosing a
conversion rule, but adds another factor to consider in determin-
ing what amount most fully compensates a plaintiff without pro-
viding a windfall.
The scope of international business and litigation, combined
with fluctuations in relative value of currencies indicative of a
floating currency market, make the availability of satisfactory
awards for foreign obligations crucial. England and numerous
European countries have responded to the pressure of floating
currency markets by adopting rules equivalent to a foreign cur-
rency rule or payment-day rule.13 The reaction of courts in the
United States has been significantly more hesitant, though a shift
may be imminent.
9 See Competex, S.A. v. LaBow, 783 F.2d 333, 338 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The
payment-day rile is economically equivalent to the foreign-currency-judgment
10 See Brand, suera note 5, at 180 ("[Apure foreign currency judment rule]
is no more than a rigid home currency Judgment re combine 'it a manda-
tory 1payment date conversion rate.").
See UFMCA prefatory at 61.
12 See Brand, supra note 5, at 180.
13 See Miliangos v. George Frank, Ltd., 1976 Law Reports 443 (App. Cas.
1975) (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.) (departing from 350 years of home cur-
rency rule in English courts by awarding damages in Swiss francs);see generally
Dach, supra note 5, at 160 (discussing the changing foreign currency rules of
European countries following World War 1).
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Most commentators agree that the traditional home currency
rule enforced by U.S. courts can not adequately meet the needs of
international litigation. 14  Within the last fifteen years, a few
courts and state legislatures have responded to this crisis by for-
mulating rules requiring foreign currency awards in certain situa-
tions. The demands of commerce and the adoption of a foreign-
currency rule by English courts have significantly influenced U.S.
law in this area. Regrettably, the traditional objective of Anglo-
American civil justice, fair compensation of the victim, has re-
ceived less attention. To protect this ideal, U.S. courts and legis-
latures must fashion a currency choice rule which looks beyond
economic trends and focuses, instead, on the individual economic
realities of the effected parties, particularly the plaintiff, and select
the method of currency conversion which best achieves equity.
Section two of this comment will examine the historical back-
ground and legacy of the home-currency rule, paying particular
attention to whether any continuing barriers to foreign currency
awards exist. Section three looks at the recent abandonment of
the home-currency rule by authoritative commentators. Section
four analyzes the implications of the Erie doctrine for currency
choice decisions in order to understand the possibilities of conflict
between federal and state law.
Section five discusses the recent decisions which have signifi-
cantly undercut the home-currency doctrine and looks for any
identifiable principles which can be applied to future cases. Sec-
tion six compares the three major theories on implementation of
foreign currency awards and concludes that no current approach
produces a satisfactory balance between compensation of the vic-
tim and predictability for parties engaged in international com-
merce. The final section concludes that courts and legislatures
addressing the issue should adopt an approach which looks at the
actual economic injury suffered by the plaintiff when determining
the appropriate currency of judgment, instead of relying on man-
datory rules.
14 See Brand, supra note 5, at 139 ("It is time for the United States to aban-
don its out-dated rules on foreign currency liabilities and adopt an approach




2. LEGACY OF THE HOME-CURRENCY RULE
The decisions in In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz5 and Mitsui
& Co. v. Oceantrawl Corp.16 granting awards in foreign currencies,
broke dramatically from the overwhelming weight of precedent
and tradition requiring U.S. courts to only issue awards in dollars.
The concept that a court may only issue awards in domestic cur-
rency dates back over 350 years in the Anglo-American legal tra-
dition,17 with even earlier roots in the law of ancient Rome. 8 In
the United States, the home-currency rule has long been accepted
as a basic common law tenet with substantial judicial precedent
since the nineteenth century.
Until 1976, English courts continued to adhere to the home-
currency doctrine. However, the seminal House of Lords deci-
sion in Miliangos v. George Frank, Ltd., granting a breach of con-
tract award in Swiss francs, overruled the centuries old common
law tenet. Since the Miliangos decision, English courts have de-
veloped a foreign currency rule applicable in all cases where the
injured party sustains a loss denominated in a foreign currency.
Despite the demise of the home-currency rule's English common
law predecessor, the majority of courts in the United States con-
tinue to accept the principle that the forum may only award
judgments in its own currency.
20
15 954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992).
16 906 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
17 See Miliangos, 1976 Law Reports at 443 (citing cases dating back to the
seventeenth century which required all judgments be denominated in sterling
pounds using a breach-day conversion rate); Becker,supra note 1, at 154; Lion,
supra note 1, at 871 n.2 ("The historical reason for the rule in England was that
the sheriff could not be expected to know the value of foreign currency and
thus could not enforce any judgments by execution unless expressed in pounds
sterling.").
18 See Dach, supra note 5, at 155 n.1 (tracing the problem of conversion of
foreign currency into domestic currency back to Roman law).
See Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 (1925); Frontera Transp. Co. v.
Abaunza, 271 F. 199 (5th Cir. 1921); Guinness v. Miller,291 F. 769 (S.D.N.Y.
1923); Dach, supra note 5, at 156 ("[l]t is a well-settled rule that courts cannot
render judgment for payment of any other money than American dollars.").
20 Only the Second and Seventh Circuits have indicated dissatisfaction with
the domestic currency rule. See Mitsui, 906 F. Supp. at 202;Amoco Cadiz, 954
F.2d at 1279. Though 20 jurisdictions have adopted the UFMCA, only a Mas-
sachusetts court has actually awarded a foreign sum. See Manches & Co. v. Gil-
bey, 646 N.E.2d 86, 89 (Mass. 1995) (awarding a judgment in pounds, to be paid
in pounds or the dollar equivalent, using the payment-day conversion rate).
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The courts invoking the home-currency doctrine have not re-
lied on any one definitive source for the rule.2' Several justifica-
tions for the rule have been asserted, including federal statute, ju-
dicial precedent, and principles of state sovereignty.
Understanding the justifications for the home-currency rule is
crucial to determining the rule's current significance.
2.1. The Coinage Act of 1792
The home-currency rule traditionally followed by U.S. courts,
has never been specifically codified.23 A few courts have referred
to section 20 of the Coinage Act of 1792 which stated, "money of
account of the United States shall be expressed in dollars or units,
dimes or tenths, cents or hundredths.., and all proceedings in
the courts.., shall be kept and had in conformity to this regula-,,24
tion,"24 as statutory support for a home-currency rule.2 ' Though
a strict reading of the language appears to prohibit any foreign
money award by a court, the purpose of the section was evidently
not to establish a home-currency rule, but to require that gov-
ernmental accounts be kept according to a decimal system, instead
of a system based on other fractional units.26 Significant doubt
has been expressed about whether S 20, in fact, ever prohibited
foreign money judgments. 27 With the 1982 repeal of section 20,
21 See Brand, supra note 5, at 158 (referring to the source of the home-
currency rule as "obscure"); Freeman, supra note 1, at 73840 (discussing several
different justifications given by various courts, including the federal statute,
common law, and the sovereignty theory).
22 See Freeman, supra note 1, at 73840; Westerheim, supra note 1, at 1208.
23 See Becker, supra note 1, at 157 (finding no federal statute barring foreign
money awards); Brand, supra note 5, at 157-59 (expressing doubt that the Coin-
age Act ever prohibited foreign money awards).
24 Coinage Act of 1792, 31 U.S.C. § 371 (repealed 1982) (codified as reen-
acted at 31 U.S.C. § 5101 (1988)).
25 See Int'l Silk Guild, Inc. v. Rogers, 262 F.2d 219, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
Shaw, Savill, Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, 189 F.2d 952, 954 & n.5 (2d
Cir. 1951); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 823, Reporters'
Notes 1 (1987); cf Baumlin & Ernst, Ltd. v. Gemini, Ltd., 637 F.2d 238, 243 &
n.9 (4th Cir. 1980) (expressing uncertainty as to whether 31 U.S.C § 5101
would prohibit a foreign currency award).
2, See 31 U.S.C. § 5101, historical and revision notes (1988); Brand, supra
note 5, at 158 n.106 & n.107 (analyzing the legislative history and writings sur-
rounding the Coinage Act of 1792 and concluding that there was no intention
to require domestic currency judgments).
See Becker, supra note 1, at 157 ("[Very little] stands in the way of the




omitting the language "'all proceedings in the courts... shall be
kept and had in conformity to this regulation' [as] surplus,"28 any
statutory barrier to non-dollar judgments became less apparent,
since the statute no longer specifically applies to courts.
Numerous commentators have asserted that because of the de-
letion of the language requiring court proceedings to be kept in
dollar units, there no longer exists a statutory prohibition of for-
eign currency awards.2 9 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Re-
lations goes so far as to state that "[c]ourts in the United States...
are not precluded from giving judgment in the currency in which
the obligation is denominated or the loss was incurred" and sup-
ports this conclusion by extensive citation to changes in the Coin-
age Act.30
The possibility that the revision did not significantly change
the law has been considered by at least one commentator. Profes-
sor Suzanne Raggio Westerheim notes the clear legislative intent
not to substantially change the law or impair the precedential
value of earlier judicial decisions, and contends that a more faith-
ful interpretation of the Coinage Act revision may be that the
home-currency doctrine remains unchanged.3' If this contention
is accepted, courts would still be prohibited under federal law
from awarding judgments in any currency other than dollars.
Brand, supra note 5, at 158 (suggesting the original intent of the Coinage Act
does not support the home currency rule); Dach, supra note 1, at 183
(addressing the question of whether the law of the United States actually pre-
vents foreign currency awards).
28 See 31 U.S.C. S 5101 historical and revision notes (1988) ("The words...
and all proceedings in the courts shall be kept and had in conformity to this
regulation' are omitted as surplus.").
29 See Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1328; Competex, S.A. v. LaBow, 783 F.2d
333, 337 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1986) (calling for reexamination of the home-currency
rule after the repeal of the Coinage Act); Westerheim,supra note 1, at 1209-13
(evaluating the proposition that the repeal of the Coinage Act allows for for-
eign money awards).
3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS S 823(1) & reporters'
note 1 (1987).
31 See Westerheim, supra note 1, at 1213 ("In light of . .. the well-
entrenched nature of the prohibition against foreign-currency judgments at the
time section 5101 was codified and enacted, it is more consistent with the Su-
preme Court's established interpretation of codified statutes to find that foreign
currency judgments are still prohibited."). A third alternative is offered: that
the omitted language "remove[s] statutory bars to contrary judicial interpreta-
tions, while ... reserv[ing] the existing federal common law interpreting the
Coinage Act." is.
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Judicial interpretations of the changes in the Coinage Act have
produced inconsistent results. Several decisions following the re-
peal of the Coinage Act continued to apply the home-currency
rule.32 However, the revised language led the Second Circuit, in
Competex v. LaBow, to call for reexamination of the presumption
that courts may not enter foreign money awards.33 Most signifi-
cantly, the repealed text served as the basis for the declaration in
Amoco Cadiz that "rt1here is now no bar to judgment in the ap-
propriate currency." The holding of the Amoco Cadiz court has
been considered by some to open the door to awards in foreign
. 35currencies.
2.2. Judicial Precedent
Despite the proclamation by the Amoco Cadiz court, the
home-currency rule continues to present an obstacle to foreign
money awards. The majority of federal courts have relied on the
common law rather than the Coinage Act as authority for this
rule. The repeal of the Coinage Act impacts the developed federal
common law only slightly. A full century of federal precedent
remains in support of the home-currency rule.
2.2.1. Implications of Federal Common Law
Entrenched federal court precedent regarding currency choice
presents the biggest obstacle to foreign money judgments. Inde-
pendent of the Coinage Act, federal courts sitting in both diver-
sity and non-diversity cases have developed a long line of prece-
dent requiring judgments in dollars. 6 The strength of this chain
32 See Sainz Gonzalez v. Banco de Santander-Puerto Rico, 932 F.2d 999 (1st
Cir 1991) (converting damages calculated in pesetas into dollars); In re Good
Hope Chem. Corp., 747 F.2d 806 (1st Cir. 1984) (requiring bankruptcy claim
denominated in German marks be convei-ted to issue judgment); Nikimiha Sec.
Ltd. v. Trend Group Ltd., 646 F. Supp. 1211, 1226 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (discussing
recent changes in the law in detail and concluding that judgment must be en-
tered in dollars); Fils Et Cables D'Acier De Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584
F. Supp. 240, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[T]his court is empowered to award a
money judgment expressed only in American dollars.").
33 Competex, 783 F.2d at 338 & n.9.
34 Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1328; see infra section 5.3.
35 See Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1279;Mitsui, 906 F.2d at 202; infra Sections
5.2.1-5.2.2.
36 See Hicks, 269 U.S. at 80, 89; Good Hope, 747 F.2d at 809; Jamaica Nutri-




of decisions demonstrates the determinative role federal courts
have played in formulating currency choice policy. 3
The decisions of Frontera Transp. Co. v. Abaunza and Hicks
v. Guinness3 8 usually serve as the judicial foundation for the home-
currency rule.39 Though nascent examples of the home-currency
rule appeared before the turn of the nineteenth century, these
cases are rarely cited.40 Justice Holmes' opinion in Hicks, like
most other decisions stating the rule, "support[s] it with citations
to earlier cases that have made the naked statement," 41 and does
not further explain the rationale for the home-currency rule.
The home-currency rule laid down in Frontera and Hicks
quickly took on the weight of doctrine, despite the absence of ex-
plicit explanation of its source by the Supreme Court. In subse-
quent cases, the inability of courts to enter non-dollar awards has
been considered settled law by federal courts, most often not even
necessitating discussion.
42
2.2.2. Use of Sovereignty Theory by Courts
The lower court decision affirmed in Hicks embodies the
"sovereignty" theory of the home-currency rule. The concept of
beskind v. Mexican Light & Power Co., 116 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir. 1941); Fre.
dericksburg, 189 F.2d at 975.
271 F. 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1921) (rejecting a lower court's award expressed
in Mexican pesos and stating that the court does not "ha[ve] the right to render
a judgment ... otherwise than in money of the United States").
38 269 U.S. 71, 71 (1925) ("[A] court in the United States can not enter a
decree or judgment in foreign money.").
39 Examples of commentators citing these cases as primary justification of
the home currency rule include, Freeman, supra note 1, at 739, and Wester-
heim, supra note 1, at 1214.
40 See Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 229 (1868); Butler v. Horwitz, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 258 (1868); The Edith, 8 F. Cas. 307, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No.
4,281). For a discussion of the holdings in these cases, see Brand,supra note 5,
at 159-61. Professor Brand concludes that language in these early opinions does
not disapprove of foreign currency judgments. See id.
41 See Brand, supra note 5, at 157 & n.97.
42 See Agfa-Gevaert, A.G. v. A.B. Dick Co., 879 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1989);
Middle E. Banking Co. v State St. Bank Int'l, 821 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1987); Inger-
soll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1987);Jamaica Nutri.
tion, 643 F.2d at 376; B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 156
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Dynamic Cassette Int'l Ltd. v. Mike Lopez & Assoc., 923 F.
Supp. 8, 12 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Pariente v. Scott Meredith Literary Agency, 771
F. Supp. 609, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Black Sea & Baltic Gen. Ins. Co. v. S.S. Hel-
lenic Destiny, 575 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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judicial sovereignty is most simply summarized using Judge
Learned Hand's words in the district court decision: "an obliga-
tion must be discharged in the money of that sovereign, none
other being available, the obligation so created can only be meas-
ured in that medium." 43 This justification suggests that a nation
and its judiciary lack the authority to create an obligation in a
foreign currency and may only enforce awards denominated in
the currency of their sovereign state. Though not frequently cited
by courts, the sovereignty theory may help to explain some
courts' treatment of the home-currency rule as self-evident.
Over the course of the last century, federal court precedent
has virtually cemented the home-currency rule. The presumption
that a court may not enter awards in a foreign currency goes
largely unquestioned. The strong federal court doctrine barring
these awards has significantly impacted state law,44 compounding
the barriers to foreign money awards.
2.3. State Law Barriers
State law could present significant barriers to foreign money
awards. Though federal diversity jurisdiction is the most com-
mon arena for disputes concerning foreign money obligations,
these cases also arise in state courts. More importantly state law
practices could influence the federal courts via the Erie doctrine,
which requires that the substantive law of the forum state applies
to federal courts sitting in diversity.46 These implications will be
discussed further in section four of this comment.
The barriers to foreign money awards in state court derive
largely from federal law. Fourteen states, including New York,
have statutes in effect which may be construed to prohibit courts
from issuing foreign currency awards, some of which are pat-
43 Guinness v. Miller, 291 F. 769, 770 (S.D.N.Y 1923),afftd, 299 F. 538 (2d
Cir. 1924), aft'd Hicks v. Guinness, 269 U.S. 71 (1925). The sovereignty princi-
ple expounded in Guinness assumes that a court cannot enforce any law but that
of its own sovereign. See id. at 770. For a more detailed analysis of the sover-
eigny principle, see Westerheim, supra note 1, at 1215-16.
See Westerheim, supra note 1, at 1220 n.119 (citing numerous cases where
state courts have followed federal precedent regarding currency-conversion is-
sues).
4 See Manches, 646 N.E.2d at 86; Teca-Print A.G. v. Amacoil Mach., Inc.
525 N.Y.S.2d 535 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988); Librairie Hachette, S.A. v. Paris Book
Ctr., 309 N.Y.S.2d 701, 62 Misc. 2d 873 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970).




terned after the Coinage Act. 47 Because some state statutes mirror
the Coinage Act verbatim, their current validity is uncertain.
48
Additionally, federal precedent concerning the home-currency
rule has influenced many state courts, and as a result state courts
have developed their own line of precedent confirming the home-
currency rule.49  These existing barriers to foreign currency
awards present an additional area of concern when considering
modernization of the United States' approach.
3. CRACKS IN THE HOME-CuRRENCY RULE
The home-currency rule, though long held doctrine in U.S.
courts, never enjoyed universal acceptance. Since World War H,
when floating currency systems began to spread, most of the
United States' trading partners have allowed foreign money
awards.50 Many commentators have criticized the United States
for failing to keep up with other states and relying on an anti-
quated rule with no valid source in natural law.5 ' Despite the
prevalence of this criticism, only recently have prominent legal
authorities in the United States urged that the home-currency rule
be displaced.52 The new perspective is apparent in both the
UFMCA and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations.
47 See ARK. STAT. ANN. S 29-115 (1947); IDAHO CODE S 28-42-402; IOWA
CODE ANN. S 535.1 (West 1950); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. S 1.53 (West 1973);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. S 11-101 (1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS.
ANN. S 438.1 (West 1978); N.Y. JUD. LAW S 27 (McKinney 1983) (amended
1987); S.C. CODE ANN. S 34-31-10 (Law Co-op. 1977);TENN. CODE ANN.
47-14-101 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 (1984); W. VA. CODE S 47-6-1 (1980)
(amended 1990); Brand, supra note 5, at 169-71 (citing statutes containing home-
currency language as of 1985).
48 See Becker, supra note 1, at 57; Brand, supra note 5, at 169 (questioning
the status of state laws (three of which are currently in effect) which mirror the
language of the Coinage Act); Dach, supra note 5 at 156.
9 See Westerheim, supra note 1, at 1219 & n.119.
50 See Brand, supra note 5, at 154 n.85 (detailing Canadian policy in foreigncurrency judgments which requires home currency judgments); see generally
Dach, supra note 5 (discussing the modernization of European conversion rules
following World War I).
51 See Becker, supra note 1, at 157 (advocating that U.S. courts adopt the
Miliangos holding); Brand, supra note 5, at 139 (referrin to the rule as "out-
dated"); Dach, supra note 5, at 183 (noting the need for fWexibiity by courts in
conversion dlay choices).
52 See UFMCA, at 61; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS S 823
(1987).
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3.1. The UFMCA's Foreign-Currency Rule
In 1989, the National Conference and Commission on Uni-
form State Laws approved the Uniform Money Claims Act.
Since then, it has been enacted in substantial part by twenty
states, with an additional state, Massachusetts recognizing it as
persuasive authority for judge made law.53 The primary intention
of the UFMCA was to replace the home-currency rule with an
approach calling for awards in foreign currencies.5
4
The drafters of the UFMCA apparently believed that a home-
currency rule was no longer satisfactory. The UFMCA lists the
following reasons for formulating a foreign currency rule: the in-
crease in foreign money claims as a result of international trade,
the fluctuation in the value of the dollar in relation to other cur-
rencies, and the use of foreign money awards by the United
States' trading partners.5 5  The UFMCA does not specifically
mention the existence of statutory or common law barriers to
foreign money awards either in its preface, notes, or body.
5 6
Though no mention of the potential conflict is made, the
terms of the UFMCA clearly violate the home-currency rule.
The UFMCA specifically requires "judgments and arbitration
awards... be entered in the foreign money rather than United
States dollars" when the obligation is denominated in the money
of a foreign country.5 7 The UFMCA does allow for the payment
of a foreign money award in dollars usinF the payment date as the
conversion date at the debtor's option.5  This, however, is eco-
nomically identical to payment in the foreign currency. Since the
UFMCA provides this as a choice of the debtor and not of the
court, it can not be reconciled with the home-currency rule. The
UFMCA allows a forum court to determine the currency of
51 See UFMCA, Tbl. of Jurisdictions, at 60; Manches & Co. v. Gilbey, 646
N.E.2d 86, 88-89 & n.7 (Mass. 1995) (awarding judgment in pounds sterling
based on the UFMCA's payment day rule, but leaving open the question of
whether to adopt other applications of the UFMCA).54
See UFMCA, at 61. The prefatory note explains the purpose of the act
as follows: "[to facilitate] uniform judicial determination of claims expressed in
the money of foreign countries. It requires judgments and arbitration awards




51 See id. at 61.




judgment in only one situation: when the parties do not agree on
which currency should be used.59 Potential disagreements on the
currency of judgment are likely to occur in situations where there
has been a shift in relative currency values.60  Therefore, under
the UFMCA a court may frequently be required to determine the
currency of judgment. However, the factors provided by the
UFMCA for determining the appropriate currency focus on the
economic dealings of the parties and give no preference to the
currency of the forum.61 Thus, courts would not be able to use
the UFMCA default currency choice rules as a means of imple-
menting a home-currency rule.
The UFMCA was constructed specifically to facilitate foreign
money awards. The positive reception it has received by so many
states indicates that support for the home-currency rule is waning.
In Section four of this Comment, the UFMCA's legal significance
will be discussed further.
3.2. The Restatement's Flexible Rule
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations also adopts the
view that foreign money awards should be permitted. The rule it
sets forth in section 823, simply asserts that U.S. courts "are not
precluded from giving judgment in the currency in which the ob-
ligation is denominated or the loss was incurred. 6 2 The Restate-
" See a S 4.
60 See Westerheim, supra note 1, at 1222-24.
61 See UFMCA, at S 4. This section provides:
(a) The money in which the parties to a transaction have agreed that
payment is to be made is the proper money of the claim for payment.
(b) If the parties to a transaction have not otherwise agreed, the proper
money of the claim, as in each case may be appropriate, is the money:
(1) regularly used between the parties as a matter of usage or course of
dealing;
(2) used at the time of a transaction in international trade, by trade us-
age or common practice, for valuing or settling transactions in the par-
ticular commodity or service involved; or
(3) in which the loss was ultimately felt or will be incurred by the
party claimant.
I 6S
6See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS 823 (1987).
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ment finds no bar to foreign currency awards in either the Coin-
age Act or common law.63
The text of the rule does not reveal a preference for either dol-lar "64
lar or foreign money awards. However, in the comment to sec-
tion 823, courts are urged to issue judgment in a foreign currency
at the request of the injured party when such a judgment fully
compensates the injured party without providing either party
with a windfall. 6' The guiding objective behind the Restatement's
policy is the equitable treatment of both parties.66 To accomplish
this goal in all situations, a foreign currency judgment or its eco-
nomic equivalent use of payment-day conversion rate must be
available as a remedy.
The Restatement approach has been considered persuasive
authority by courts addressing the issue of currency conversion
choice.6  By allowing for foreign currency awards, the Restate-
ment seriously injures the efficacy of the home-currency rule.
However, the Restatement is not a substitute for binding law. To
determine the legal status of the home-currency rule consideration
must be given to issues of federalism and the impact of recent case
law.
4. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE LAW
The adoption of the UFMCA by twenty states highlights the
importance of determining whether currency choice rules are sub-
stantive or procedural for purposes of Erie analysis. Conflict
among federal and state law in this area is a relatively new devel-
opment. Prior to 1987, it appeared that no state had statutes call-
ing for foreign currency judgments.68  State courts typically
looked to federal precedent regarding currency choice and uni-
63 See id. cmt. b.
6See id.
65 See id.
See id cmt. c (explaining that the courts' goal should be to "assure that
neither party receives a windfall or is penalized as a result of currency conver-
sion ").S) See In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1328 (7th Cir.
1992); Competex, S.A. v. LaBow, 783 F.2d 333, 336 n.5 (2d Cir. 1986); Mitsui &
Co. v. Oceantrawl Corp., 906 F. Supp 202, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
68 See Brand, supra note 5, at 169-71 (cataloging the position of state statutes




formly applied the home-currency rule.69 Federal courts sitting in
state jurisdictions requiring foreign money awards have not
squarely addressed the issue of which rule would prevail.
4.1. Implications of Erie for Choosing Currency ofjudgment
The fate of the currency choice issue under the Erie doctrine
has not been confronted. Federal courts might look toward their
treatment of currency conversion rules as a pattern for currency
choice decisions. Federal courts consider the choice of foreign
currency conversion rules to be substantive and not procedural.
Consistent with Erie doctrine,70 federal courts apply state law
governing conversion rules in diversity suits7 1 and federal law
when sitting in non-diversity cases.72
Federal courts, however, have treated the issues of currency
choice and conversion rules separately.7 3 When dealing with the
issue of currency choice, federal courts consistently cite earlier
69 See Westerheim, supra note 1, at 1220, n.119 (citing numerous cases
where state courts have followed federal precedent regarding currency-
conversion issues).
70 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
71 See Competex, 783 F.2d at 334; Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981); Dynamic Cassette Int'l Ltd. v. Mike Lopez
& Assoc., 923 F. Supp 8 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). TheVishipco court repeated the syl-
logism that since "there is no Federal Rule of [Civil] Procedure on the subject"
the rule "is substantive rather than procedural" followed the dictate of Erie by
applying New York's breach-day rule instead of the federal common law rule
of Judgment day conversion. Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 865-66.
Taking a different approach, but reaching the same decision that conversion
rules are substantive, the federal district court inNikimiha applied an "outcome
determinative" test. Nikimiha Sec. Ltd. v. Trend Group Ltd., 646 F.Supp.
1211, 1228 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
Secondary authorities also take the position that choice of currency is a sub-
stantive question. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 144
(1969) grants the forum court authority to determine conversion rates, while
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations section 823(1) & comment a, also
says the forum court should set conversion rates and apparently gives the forum
the same ability to specify a foreign currency award.
72 Suits brought under maritime law or Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
9, would be subject to federal common law currency rules. See Shaw, Savill,
Albion & Co. v. The Fredericksburg, 189 F.2d 952, 956 (2d Cir. 1951); Fils Et
Cables D'Acier De Lens v. Midland Metals Corp., 584 F. Supp. 240, 246
(S.D.N.Y. 1984).
73 Typically, courts have made a cursory conclusion that a decision must be
issued in dollars, ruling on its substantive or procedural characterization, and
then proceeds to consider the currency conversion rule and state law implica-
tions. See cases cited supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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federal precedent in support of the home-currency rule, without
considering the substantive/procedural characterization of this
choice or referring to state law.74 Until the recent adoption of the
UFMCA and the decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in
Manches & Co. v. Gilbey7 5 awarding judgment in pounds, no po-
tential for conflict existed, making the issue of which law con-
trolled moot.
Now the unsettled issue is of key significance in determining
the efficacy of the home-currency rule. Three different interpre-
tations are possible. First, if currency choice is considered, like
conversion rules, to be substantive, state law would govern and
foreign currency awards would be permissible in all the states
adopting the UFMCA and any state which chose by statute or ju-
dicial decision to allow foreign money awards. Second, if cur-
rency choice is deemed procedural, as done by the House of Lords
in Miliangos, federal law would govern in federal diversity, as well
as non-diversity, suits.76 This would allow foreign money awards
in federal circuits that permit them, but prevent plaintiffs from
receiving foreign money awards in circuits following the tradi-
tional home-currency rule. A third possibility exists: that federal
courts will find currency choice substantive, but consider it to
have international significance warranting the development of
controlling federal common law.77 If currency choice falls into
this exception, as some commentators have suggested, the federal
common law regarding the home-currency rule may serve as an
obstacle to foreign currency awards, even if authorized by state
statue.
4.2. Conflict Between State and Federal Law
The express purpose of the UFMCA, adopted by twenty
states, runs counter to the home-currency rule. The preface to the
UFMCA states as its purpose to "facilitate[] uniform judicial de-
74 See cases cited supra note 42.
' 646 N.E.2d 86, 88 (Mass. 1995) (applying the payment day rule as a mat-
ter of common law and awarding judgment in pounds).
76 See Brand, supra note 5, at 172.
77 See id. at 174-76 (arguing that the development of federal common law in
currency rules is necessary to achieve international comity and encourage free
trade and that any federal common law should provide for foreign money
awards); Westerheim, supra note 1, at 1217-19 (discussing how the international





termination of claims expressed in the money of foreign coun-
tries."7s  It requires judgments and arbitration awards in these
cases to be entered in the foreign money rather than in U.S. dol-
lars.7 9 The mandate that awards be paid in the currency of obliga-
tion may be avoided in only two situations. First, if the currency
of obligation is disputed the UFMCA provides criteria to deter-
mine the currency for payment, giving no preference to awards in
dollars.80 Second, at the debtor's option payment may be made in
dollars at a payment-day conversion rate. The UFMCA pro-
vides no other means by which a forum court could insist on issu-
ing an award in dollars.
An obvious conflict exists between the law of the twenty-one
U.S. jurisdictions (including Massachusetts) which have accepted
UFMCA principles and the federal home-currency rule. 2 How-
ever, this issue has yet to be confronted, let alone resolved, by the
courts, leaving the status of the UFMCA in doubt. No reliable
indications exist as to how a conflict between the UFMCA and
the federal home-currency rule will be resolved.
4.3. Potential Conflict Between Federal and New York State
Law
One explanation for federal court failure to confront the
UFMCA is the fact that the most frequent forum state for inter-
national litigation, New York, 3  does not recognize the
78 UFMCA prefatory note, at 61 (Supp. 1997).
79 See id.
80 See id. S 4.
81 See id. S7(b). This. choice has no effect upon the economic substance of
the claim, since upon receipt, the creditor could also convert the award into the
other currency of his choice, with no potential for gain or loss. See Competex,
783 F.2d at 338-39.
82 See Manches, 646 N.E.2d at 87, 88 (finding no rule of law which bars an
award of damages expressed in foreign currency, the court looked to the
UFMCA and Amoco Cadiz as persuasive authority and granted an award in
English pounds, to be paid in pounds or dollars converted at the payment day
rate); see also statutes cited supra note 4.
See Freeman, supra note 1, at 748 n.74 (citing the City Bar Association
Memorandum in Support of S. 5625-A and A. 7563-A GJuly 20, 1987)). The
New York amendment to S 27 was apparently motivated in part by a desire to
maintain New York's leadership as a f6rum for international litigation. See id.
at 748.
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UFMCA.14 New York law, however, also presents potential con-
flicts with a federal home-currency rule.
Until 1988, New York Judiciary Law required that judgments
be computed in dollars and New York courts consistently applied
a breach-day rule. 5  Likewise, federal courts within New York
applied the New York breach-day rule.8 6 The 1988 amendment
to the judiciary laws added a section that sets forth a mandatory
rule whereby:
In any case in which the cause of action is based upon an
obligation denominated in a currency other than currency
of the United States, a court shall render or enter a judg-
ment or decree in the foreign currency of the underlying
obligation. Such judgment or decree shall be converted
into currency of the United States at the rate of exchange
prevailing on the date of entry of the judgment or decree.
The added passage, like the UFMCA, requires that a foreign
money claim be entered in the currency of the underlying obliga-
tion. However, the New York law mandates conversion of any
foreign amount into U.S. dollars. Presumably, the resulting
judgment must be paid in U.S. dollars, and could not be satisfied
by the pa (ment of the foreign money judgment in the foreign
currency.
84 See UFMCA, Table of Jurisdictions, at 60.
85 See N.Y. JUD. LAW S 27 (McKinney 1983) (amended 1987); Parker v.
Hoppe, 257 N.Y. 333 (1931); Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235 N.Y. 37 (1923);
Librairie Hachette, S.A. v. Paris Book Ctr., 309 N.Y.S.2d 701, 62 Misc. 2d 873
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970); Kantor v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 226 N.Y.S 582 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1928). At one point, the breach-day rule was so deeply embedded in New
York jurisprudence that it was referred to as the "New York rule." See Dach,
supra note 5, at 156-57.
86 See Middle E. Banking Co. v. State St. Bank Int'l, 821 F.2d 897 (2d Cir.
1987); Competex, 783 F.2d at 334; Vishipco, 660 F.2d at 854.
Curiously, one federal court continued to apply the breach-day rule after the
Judiciary Law was amended and the Second Circuit indicated that the judgment
day rule should be followed. See Elevator Motors Corp. v. Leistritz Aktienge-
selschaft, 1990 WL 127596 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 1996).
" N.Y. JuD. LAW S 27(b) (McKinney 1996).
88 See Freeman, supra note 1, at 750. Freeman provides the following illus-
tration:
[A] court may initially provide for the rendering of a judgment in




If the New York rule does not actually call for enforcement of
a foreign judgment, but only specifies a judgment-day conversion
rule, then no conflict exists with a federal home-currency rule.
Federal courts need only apply the conversion rule of the New
York forum, as they have done in the past. In fact, this change
brings New York law in closer conformity with federal court rul-
ings, which have recently expressed a preference for the judgment-
day conversion rule.
89
Post-1987 federal court decisions indicated inconsistent inter-
pretations of the New York statute. The bulk of cases have read
the change as creating no conflict with the home-currency rule
and merely requiring application of a judgment-day conversion
rule. 90 One case, Elevator Motors Corp. v. Leistritz Aktienge-
sellschaft,9' failed to reach this interpretation and continued to ap-
ply the old breach-day rule after both the 1988 amendment and a
New York Superior Court decision in Teca.Print, A.G. v. Amacoil
Mach., Inc.,92 calling for use of the judgment-day rule.
The proposition that the change in New York law authorizes
foreign money judgments without requiring payment in dollars is
into U.S. dollars; the prevailing litigant does not necessarily receive by
judicial decree his recovery in French francs .... Apparently such a
judgment must ultimately still be converted back into U.S. dollars.
IML
The most compelling argument for this interpretation results from the effect of
a contrary interpretation. If the New York statute were read to provide the
debtor a choice of settling the obligation in either'the foreign currency or dollar
amount of the award (determined using the judgment-day rate), the debtor
would be able to settle the claim by paying the sum which is worth less on the
payment day. To illustrate, suppose:
Original Obligation: £100
Judgment in U.S. at exchange rate of £1 = $1: $100
Value of £100 on payment date at exchange rate of £1 = $.75: $75
Obviously, the debtor would tender the £100.
89 See Agfa-Gevaert, A.G. v. A.B. Dick Co., 879 F.2d 1518, 1524 (7th Cir.
1989); In re Good Hope Chem. Corp., 747 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1985).
See Dynamic Cassette, 923 F. Supp. at 12; Sainz Gonzalez v. Banco De
Santander-Puerto Rico, 932 F.2d 999, 1003 (1st Cir. 1991) (requiring compensa-
tory damages calculated in pesetas to be converted to dollars according to New
York's judgment-day rule); Agfa-Gevaert, 876 F.2d at 1524 (requiring damages
to be converted using New York's judgment-day conversion rule).
91 1990 WL 127596 (deciding case while apparently unaware of the change
in the law). The district court has reevaluated New York law and now applies
the judgment-day rule. SeeDynamic Cassette, 923 F. Supp. at 12.
92 See Teca-Print, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
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not without support. Legislative history indicates that the avail-
ability of foreign money awards in foreign jurisdictions concerned
proponents of the law who desired to keep New York competi-
tive.93 Additionally, the District Court for the Southern District
of New York has cited section 26 of the New York Judiciary Law
as apparent support for awarding a judgment in foreign cur-
rency. Though it is conceivable that courts could stretch the
New York law to authorize non-dollar judgments, federal courts
have not recognized this potential conflict.
5. RECENT CASE LAW
After the repeal of the Coinage Act in 1982, federal courts
continued to gloss over the issue of foreign currency judgments.
Courts took nearly a decade to recognize the demise of the Eng-
lish common law predecessor to the American home-currency
rule.95 The revolutionary House of Lords decision in Miliangos v.
George Frank Ltd. rejected hundreds of years of precedent behind
the home-currency doctrine, finding it inapplicable to modern
commercial reality.
9 6
5.1. The Impact ofMiliangos
In Miliangos, the House of Lords overruled centuries of Eng-
lish common law requiring all judicial awards be denominated in
pounds sterling.17  The case involved a contract dispute over a
transaction that was handled in Swiss francs. At the time, English
precedent dictated that all judgments be entered in sterling
pounds to be converted using a breach-day conversion rule which
93 See Freeman, supra note 1, at 746-49 (discussing the history surrounding
the § 26 amendment, specifically the motivation to amend the conversion rule
in order to remain competitive with forums offering foreign currency and
payment-day remedies).
94 See Mitsui & Co. v. Oceantrawl Corp., 906 F. Supp. 202, 204 (S.D.N.Y.
1995). Not claiming to be applying New York law, Judge Cedarbaum quoted
only the following language: "In any case in which the cause of action is based
upon an obligation denominated in a currenc other than currency of the
United States, a court shall render or enter a gment or decree in the foreign
currency of the underlying obligation." Id. The portion of the statute requir-
ing conversion to dollars was omitted. See id.
95 See Competex S.A. v. LaBow, 783 F.2d 333, 337 (2d Cir. 1986).





set the exchange rate at the date money originally became due.98
Because of the devaluation of the sterling pound in relation to the
Swiss franc that occurred between the time of breach and recov-
ery, the plaintiff faced potential loss of £28,000.
99
This potential for unfairness created by fluctuations in the
modern currency market was the primary reason cited by Lord
Wilberforce for adopting a rule allowing for foreign currency
awards.'00
The House of Lords was strongly motivated by a desire to
formulate a rule which would not disadvantage plaintiffs in times
of decline in the value of the pound.'0 ' The home-currency rule
combined with a breach-day conversion rate had historically
served plaintiffs well when the pound enjoyed ascendancy among
world currencies. However, the decline in status of the pound
relative to world currencies was deemed to require revision of the
traditional rule.
To address this problem, the House of Lords chose a foreign-
currency rule. The rule applied in the case allowed the defendant
the choice of paying the amount of the award, as expressed in for-
eign currency, or paying the equivalent sum as determined on the
date of payment. Effectively, this granted the debtor the choice
between the economic equivalents of a foreign currency award
and payment-day conversion rule.'0 3 This method decreased the
potential for gamesmanship presented by the breach rule, since
any fluctuation in exchange rates would be reflected in the domes-
98 See Di Ferdinando v. Simon, Smits & Co., [1920] 3 K.B. 409; In re
United Ry. of Havana & Regla Warehouse, Ltd., [1961] App. Cas. 1007;S.S.
Celia v. S.S. Volturno, [1921] App. Cas. 544.
9 See Becker, supra note 1, at 155 ("[B]etween the date in 1971 when pay-
ment was due and the date of the hearing, sterling had fallen in value as against
the Swiss franc from 9.90 to 6.00 to the pound. If Miliangos could recover
judgment in Swiss francs he would recover, in sterling terms, some £60,000,
whereas the sterling equivalent at the 1971 rate would yield only £42,000.").
100 In his speech to the House of Lords, Lord Wilberforce discussed the in-
stability of the currency market caused by floating currencies and the negative
impact this might have on injured parties, asserting that change was "urgent in
the interest of justice." Miiangos 1976 Law Reports at 463. In his opinion the
payment day approach taken by the court was "adapted to giving the injured
plaintiff that amount in damages which will most fairly compensate him for the
wrong which he has suffered." Id. at 468.
1o Id.
102 See Brand, supra note 5, at 153.
103 See Competex, 783 F.2d at 338.
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tic currency award. 10 4 The majority decisions in the House of
Lords did not address the potential that the new rule might work
against an injured party in times of a strong pound. Their pri-
mary concern apparently was to formulate a rule which best
served the economic realities of the day.' 5
A straight payment-day conversion rule could implement the
Miliangos principle without requiring an actual judgment in for-
eign currency. This could be achieved by expressing an award in
a dollar amount to be determined on the date of payment in the
future; the dollar amount would be equivalent to the foreign
money award using the prevailing rate of exchange on the day of
payment. A system like this might very well circumvent the
home-currency rule, though some procedural barriers do exist.1
0 6
The Miliangos decision generated a considerable response in
the United States. At least one federal court and one state court
104 See Agfa-Gevaert, A.G. v. A.B. Dick Co., 879 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1989)
(noting the wide availability of hedging to offset the injured parties exposure to
risk from currency fluctuation and suggesting that a breach-day rule is not de-
sirable); Competex, 783 F.2d at 338-39 (discussing neutrality of payment-day and
judgment-day rules); supra Section 3.2.
Courts in the United States have not addressed the fact that a payment-day rule
only benefits a plaintiff in times of weak domestic currency. Using theMilian-
gos example, assuming that sterling has risen in value from 9.00 to 12.00 francs
per pound, the plaintiff would be entitled to the equivalent of £28,000 less un-
der the payment day approach then under the old breach-day rule. Miliangos,
1976 Law Reports at 443.
Some commentators have argued that the shift in approach by the British court
was directly motivated by the declining value of the sterling in relationship to
other currencies. See Lion, supra note 1, at 887-88 & n.87. Lord Denning is
quoted as follows:
Why have we in England insisted on a judgment in sterling and noth-
ing else? It is, I thin , because of our faith in sterling. It was a stable
currency which had no equal. Things are different now. Sterling
floats in the wind .... This change compels us to think again about
our rules.
Id.; see also Brand, supra note 5, at 153. See generally, Dach, supra note 5
(arguing that currency rules are not fixed but flexible and responsive to eco-
nomic pressures).
105 See Becker, supra note 1, at 156 (quoting Lord Wilberforce who explains
"[t]he situation as regards currency stability has substantially changed even
since 1961 .... [and] the search for a formula to deal with it becomes urgent in
the interest of justice").
106 See Competex, 783 F.2d at 338. The court in Competex refers to proce-
dural obstacles to both foreign-currency judgments and a payment-day rZl pre-
sented by Forms 31 and 32, Appendix of Forms to Fed. R. Civ. P., Which call




have embraced the approach set forth in Miliangos of allowing the
debtor the choice of foreign currency payment or domestic cur-
rency payment at the payment-day conversion rate.10 7 All twenty
states adopting the UFMCA, likewise, have put into effect legisla-
tion modeled on the seminal English case.10 An additional state,
Massachusetts, applies the principles of Miliangos via judicially
formulated law.
Additionally, the core of the Miliangos doctrine appears in the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, which provides that
U.S. courts "are not precluded from giving judgment" in non-
dollar form, and that " [a] judgment denominated in a foreign cur-
rency may be satisfied either in that currency or by payment of an
equivalent amount in dollars measured by the rate of exchange in
effect on the date of payment." 10 9 The Miliangos decision has pro-
voked reexamination of the traditional home-currency rule, de-
spite the fact that the holding has no binding implication on U.S.
law.
Though delayed by decades, the impact of Miliangos in the
United States is now evident. The once stalwart home-currency
rule shows signs of weakness from nearly every direction: federal
courts, state courts, state legislatures, and persuasive authorities.110
Federal courts have shown mounting dissatisfaction, 111 and in
some cases, disregard" 2 for the conventions of past courts, putting
the United States in a position quite similar to the British judici-
ary right before Miliangos.
107 See In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1327 & 1337
(7th Cir. 1992) (awarding an amount in French francs and recognizing the ease
with which an award denominated in foreign currency may be converted to an
equivalent dollar amount on the day of payment); Manches & Co. v. Gilbey,
646 N.E.2d 86 (Mass. 1995) (following the UFMCA which essentially embodies
the Miliangos rule).
10 See UFMCA, prefatory note at 61 (Supp. 1997) (explaining the purpose
of the rule to advance a payment-day approacl and citingMiliangos as the lead-
ing example of the rule).
109 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS S 823(1) & cmt. b (1987).
110 See UFMCA, Table of Jurisdictions, at 60; RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
FOREIGN RELATIONS S 823 (1987); Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1279; Manches,
646 N.E.2d at 88-89 (rejecting home-currency rule and awarding judgment in
pounds); Mitsui & Co. v. Oceantrawl Corp., 906 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
See Competex, 783 F.2d at 336-37.
112 SeeAmoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1279; Mitsui, 906 F. Supp. at 202.
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5.2. A Call for Reexamination: Competex v. LaBow
As in Miliangos, one of the primary concerns of courts in the
United States has been the potential unfairness of the breach-day
rule. In Competex v. LaBow, the Second Circuit undertook a
broad examination of the breach-day rule, concluding that the
rule goes beyond the intended purpose of making the plaintiff
whole and promotes gamesmanship by the creditor who is effec-
tively given the option to choose the exchange rate most benefi-
cial to him." 3 The court went on to express its preference for "a
conversion rule of general application that is neutral between the
parties with respect to currency fluctuation."" 4 According to the
analysis of the court, either a foreign currency rule or payment-
day conversion rule can best achieve neutrality, but a judgment-
day rule also is acceptable."
5
113 See Competex, 738 F.2d at 338-39. To illustrate, the following example is
provided using the same figures provided by the court:
Plaintiff brings suit in an English court and receives judgment for £1. On the
date of the English judgment, the prevailing exchange rate was £1 = $1. Two
scenarios are examined: (a) on the date of action in a United States court the
pound has depreciated and the rate is £1 =$.60 and (b) on that date of action in
the United States the pound has appreciated in value and the exchange rate
£1 =$1.30.
Under the breach day rule the plaintiff would be entitled to collect in a U.S.
court the amount of dollars equivalent to the judgment as converted using the
rate in effect at the time of the English judgment, thus, receiving $1.00.
In situation (a) where the pound has depreciated, the plaintiff would seek to col-
lect on the U.S. award of $1.00, instead of the English award worth only $.60.
However, if the pound has appreciated, the plaintiff will disregard the U.S.
award worth $1.00, and collect in England on the original judgment, now
worth $1.30. See id. at 338-39
The obvious result is that the plaintiff will collect on the highest judgment with
the highest value at the time of collection. This opportunity for gamesmanship
presumes that the defendant has property in both countries. If the defendant
only has property in one country, the breach-day rule is neutral, since the
choice of where to collect is eliminated. See id. at 336 & n.4.
114 Id. at 337. This echoes the principle expressed by justice Holmes, in
Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 (1926), that an award
should not be enlarged simply because it is enforced in a United States court.
"' See Competex, 783 F.2d at 337-39. The court argues that the judgment-
day rule is neutial because the plaintiff is exposed to the same risk and has the
same potential for benefit as if he had collected on the original award. The
court's example follows:
If plaintiff holds an English judgment for £1 and the value of £1 depre-
ciates from $1.00 to $.60 as of the date of the American judgment, the
American court enters judgment for $.60, and plaintiff loses $.40. But




In Competex, the court expressed its disfavor with the Re-
statement's proposals." 6  The court apparently approved of the
Restatement's provisions allowing foreign judgments in U.S.
courts and the use of a payment-day conversion rule." 7 The area
of contention surrounded comment (c) of the Restatement, which
requires courts to choose the currency conversion rate most fa-
vorable to the plaintiff:
[I]f the foreign currency has depreciated since the injury or
breach, judgment should be given at the rate of exchange
applicable on the date of injury or breach; if the foreign
currency has appreciated since injury or breach, judgment
should be given at the rate of exchange applicable on the
date of judgment or the date of payment.
Believing this rule to be a "more extreme rule of creditor's
preference," the court felt it allowed the creditor to speculate
without facing risk.'19
The ideal of neutrality in conversion rules promoted by the
Competex court is not reflected in Miliangos or its progeny. The
primary objective in British courts, as well as most U.S. courts,
has been the fair compensation of the plaintiff.120 Though some
have interpreted the Miliangos rule to require mandatory applica-
tion of the foreign currency rule for foreign obligations, even if
Had plaintiff executed his English judgement, he would have lost the
equivalent of $.40 as a result of the pound's appreciation. Conversely,
if the value of £1 appreciates from $1 to $1.30, the American court en-
ters judgment for $1.30, and plaintiff makes $.30, the equivalent of
what he would have made had he executed on the English judgment.
Id. at 338-39.
116 See id. at 336.
117 See id. at 337-38.
... See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS S 823, cmt. c (1987).
119 See Competex, 783 F.2d at 336.
120 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS S 823, cmt. c
(asserting that the traditional objective of putting the plaintiff in the same posi-
tion as if the injury had not occurred applies equally to currency selection is-
sue); Miliangos, 1976 Law Reports at 465 ("[J]ustice demands that the creditor
should not suffer from fluctuations in the value of sterling.").
1998]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. . Int'l Econ. L.
detrimental, 121 indications are that British courts will approach
currency choice with a pro-plaintiff bias.' z2 Apparently, British
courts exercise deference to the plaintiff when determining the
proper currency for judgment and do not automatically accept
that a foreign currency is appropriate if it would disadvantage theplaintiff. 23
As in Britain, neutrality in conversion rules has not been the
foremost objective of U.S. courts. Though the Competex court
calls for neutral rules in selecting currency and conversion rates, it
is unclear how other courts would handle the situation where the
plaintiff faces injury because of depreciation in the foreign cur-
rency exchange rates.
5.3. Foreign Currency Awards in the United States
There have been three decisions awarding amounts in foreign
currency since the repeal of the Coinage Act in 1982.124 These in-
stances represent the exceptions, rather than the rule. Each case
has involved unique circumstances and has not evolved into a
generally accepted rule.
5.3.1. The Amoco Cadiz
The Seventh Circuit's decision In re Amoco Cadiz represented
the first instance of a U.S. federal court squarely refuting the as-
sumption that courts cannot enter judgments in a foreign cur-
rency.' The case involved the 1978 wreck of an oil tanker off
the coast of Brittany. 126 The liability issue was consolidated at the
121 See Brand, supra note 5, at 180 n.220 (citing to courts and commentators
that express the opinion that fairness requires application of theMiliangos for-
eign currency rule in all cases).
122 See Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1328 ("[T]he dominant principle of cur-
rency selection in British law is adequate compensation of the victim .... ).
See id. at 1328 (expressing dissatisfaction with the British approach of
looking backwards from the perspective of compensating the creditor to choose
a judgment currency in cases involving multiple currencies). But see Brand, su-
pra note 5, at 180 n.220 (discussing various interpretations of the British foreign
currency rule).
124 See Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1279;Mitsui, 906 F.Supp. at 202;Manches,
646 N.E.2d at 86; cf Fils Et Cables D'Acier De Lens v. Midland Metals Corp.,
584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (granting an award in French franc to be con-
verted to d-ollars at the rate effective on the date of judgment).
125 See Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1328 (finding "no bar to judgment in the
appropriate currency and affirming an award in French francs).




district court level and resulted in a judgment awarding one plain-
tiff, Petroleum Insurance Limited, 21,215,054.68 pounds sterling
and a second I roup of French claimants almost 600 million
French francs.1  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
award of francs, but required the sum in sterling to be converted
into dollars. 12' The court recognized the ground breaking signifi-
cance of its decision and asserted that, "there is now no bar to
judgment in the appropriate currency." 29 Besides citing the re-
peal of the Coinage Act of 1792, the Restatement (Third) of For-
eign Relations, and the UFMCA, the court also relied heavily
upon post-Miliangos English cases to support its decision to affirm
the foreign currency award. 30
The court set forth a mechanical rule for choosing the proper
currency for judgment. 3 ' The court declared that in all cases,
without exception, the currency of judgment should be that se-
lected by the parties for their own dealings: "When all the transac-
tions occur in dollars, the award should be in dollars. Always.
When they occur in some other currency, the award should be in
that currency. Always." 132 The court recognized that this basic
rule could not apply to relationships enveloping multiple curren-
cies, but did not articulate criteria for choosing one currency over
another. 33
The Seventh Circuit's rationale for announcing a rigid cur-
rency of transaction rule was apparently the desire for neutrality
and predictability in the currency selection process. The court
expressed disapproval of the flexible British practice in foreign
currency cases of determining what is the appropriate currency of
judgment by looking backwards at what best compensates the in-
i2 See id at 1290.
128 See id. at 1330.
129 Id. at 1328.
130 See id. ("[T]he English rule should be used in the United States too ...
because it is the right rule for commerce."). The court cited numerous English
cases and discussed the British case Attorney General of Ghana v. Texaco Over-
seas Tankships Ltd, No. 1988/2606 (Q.B. July 30, 1991) in greater detail than
any United States case pertaining to the issue. See id. at 1328.
131 See Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1329-30 (characterizing the proposed rule
as inflexible and mechanical).
132 Id. at 1329.
133 See id
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jured party. 34 The court selectively referred to the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations provisions on foreign currency
awards. The court approved of Section 823(1) that allows for for-
eign currency judgments and the reporters' note 3, calling for the
expression of damages in the "currency in which the price is ex-
pressed." 3 5 However, the court omitted reference to significant
portions of the Restatement expressing a pro-plaintiff motiva-
tion.1
36
Instead, the court emphasized the objective of respecting both
parties' choice of currency for the transaction, presuming that by
choosing to deal in a particular currency, the parties assumed the
risk of fluctuation in that currency. 13  The court was particularly
critical of flexibility in currency choice or conversion rules, be-
lieving that they cause unnecessary risk for the litigating par-
ties.13 " According to the court, its simple 'currency-of-transaction
= currency-of-judgment' rule allows "the parties to handle the
risks themselves."13'9
The court also recognized the role of hedging-when parties
exposed to risk in a certain currency obtain off-setting positions
in another currency in order to insulate themselves against down-
turns in exchange rates-in the context of foreign claim cases.
140
134 See id. at 1329-30 (analyzing British case law and determining that it al-
lowed for flexibility in setting the currency of judgment in order to-benefit the
plaintiff).
135 Id. at 1329 (quoting RESTATEMENT (TmnuD) FOREIGN RELATIONS
823(1) reporter's note 3). Applied to the facts of the case, the Restatement's
currency rule would probably result in the same choice as made by the court,
awarding damages in dollars, not pounds. This would follow because crude oil
is a commodity price expressed in dollars throughout the world. See Amoco
Cadiz, 954 F.2dat 1329.
136 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS 823, cmt. c, quoted su-
pra note 118.
137 See Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1328 ("Parties that conduct their dealings
in francs, rubles, pesos, yuan, bolivars, or australs either accept the risk of
changes in the value of that currency or have made provisions to hedge against
that risk.").
13 See Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1329 (expressing the view that "[t]he high-
est objective is predictability"). The court saw this predictability as closely tied
to respecting the parties' assumption of risk by dealing in a particular currency,
suggesting that uncertainty in currency or conversion iles is a greater risk than
fluctuation in exchange rates. See id.
139 id
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The court apparently approved of hedging strategies, finding it
better that parties take measures themselves to alleviate risk, than
for the court to step in with its own opinion. 1 Though not ex-
plained in detail, the court was probably correct to assume that
hedging is readily available and frequently used by parties in-
volved in transactions using certain currencies to offset their risk
exposure. 142 Consideration of hedging within currency markets
may provide a true picture of the actual economic consequences
of currency choice on some parties, but a currency choice rule
which presumes that hedging occurs may not fully compensate an
injured party who has not or could not engage in these activi-
ties.
43
By considering the possible outside economic motivations and
practices of the parties, the court in Amoco Cadiz departs from
the traditional focus of U.S. courts on conversion rate choices:
As soon as the court announces the award, the parties may eliminate
exchange risk by using the currency futures markets. For example, if
PEL [one of the claimants inAmoco Cadiz] wants to hedge against the
risk that the pound will fall against the dollar, it can buy a dollar fu-
tures contract, promising to pay in sterling. When Amoco satisfies the
judgment with sterling, PIL can close its futures position and receive
the dollar value of the award.
Id. at 1327.
14 See id. at 1328. The court presumed that "[flights over conversion dates
are inevitable whenever judges enter dollar awards to redress injuries denomi-
nated in other currencies." Id. So to alleviate the risk of uncertain conversion
rates, a mechanical foreign payment rule should be applied. With the result
that "[a]ll problems about conversion dates vanish, and the parties' hedging
strategies (or lack thereof) proceed unimpeded." Id.
"' See Agfa-Gevaert, 879 F.2d at 1518 (discussing the wide availability of
currency futures and their potential to negate loss due to currency fluctuations);
Freeman, supra note 1, at 737 (noting that international transactions and litiga-
tion can be designed to suit a foreign currency/payment-day rule).
143 See Brand, supra note 5, at 178 (concluding that a judgment-day rule or a
payment-day rule creates unfairness for the plaintiff when the home currency is
the stronger of the currencies involved).
As an illustration, suppose that in a breach of contract claim a plaintiff becomes
due £100 and brings suit in the U.S. If the rate of exchange on the day of
breach (and for simplicity) on the day of judgment is entered in the U.S. is £1
$1, the plaintiff is entitled to $100 using the breach day or judgment day rules.
However, if a payment-day or foreign currency rule is used, and the pound has
dropped in value so that on the day of payment £1 - $.75, the plaintiff recovers
£100, worth only $75, or the claim computed at that exchange rate, also, $75.
This is likely to work particularly unfaiir results in tort cases or when the in-
jured party is not economically sophisticated and has not engaged in hedging.
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fair compensation of the plaintiff.'" The two dominant rules-
breach-day conversion and judgment-day conversion-though
having different results, were designed to serve the same essential
goal: fair compensation for the plaintiff.'45 The approach can best
be summarized by the principle expressed in the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations: "j1-in general... courts have en-
deavored to select the rule that, in a given case, will prevent the
loss due to fluctuation of exchange rates from being borne by the
injured or non-breaching party." The mechanical rule of the
Amoco court departs from the traditional objective of U.S. courts
by favoring Rredictability and respecting the parties' prior busi-
ness choices. 7
A limited degree of support for the Amoco Cadiz court's con-
tention, that parties to a transaction assume the risk of fluctuating
currency, can be found in Justice Holmes' opinion in Deutsche
Bank.'4  The Amoco Cadiz court does not cite to his opinion, but
implicitly draws upon it. In Deutsche Bank, Justice Holmes' ar-
gument was that a foreign obligation should not be enlarged (or,
presumably, decreased) simply because it is brought in the United
144 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONs S 823 cmt. c re-
porter's note 4 (1987).
145 See In re Good Hope Chem. Corp., 747 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1985)
(applying a breach-day rule as required by New York law, but expressing a
preference for the judgment day rule because it awarded greater compensation
to the plaintiff. Th e acualy chosen as the breach-day was manipulated to
be as dose as possible to the judgment date.); Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 866 n.7 (2d Cir. 1981) (explaining that the purpose of
the breach-day rule is to protect the plaintiff from currency fluctuations); Teca-
Print A.G. v. Amacoil Mach., Inc., 525 N.Y.S.2d 535, 540, 138 Misc. 2d 777,
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (changing the New York court's position from breach-day
to judgment-day because it produces more fair and equitable results for the in-
jured party.); Librairie Hachette v. Paris Book Ctr., 309 N.Y.S.2d 701, 62 Misc.
2d 873, 873 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (noting the equitable result of application of
the breach-day rule because the franc had depreciated relative to the dollar);
Brand, supra note 5, at 163 n.135 & n. 137, 180 n.220 (discussing courts flexibil-
ity in applying rule to benefit the plaintiff).
RESTATEMENT (THiRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS 5823, reporter's note 4.
147 The court is not alone in taking the position that certainty of a specific
conversion rule is as important as the rule itself. See GoodHope, 747 F.2d at 812
n.8 (noting "the parties' interest in a clearly defined rule, which affords them
some degree of certainty" as justification for applying a breach-day rule the
court felt did not fully compensate the plaintiff).
148 See Deutsche Bank, 272 U.S. at 519; Brand, supra note 5, at 163 n.137;




States. 149 The Holmes opinion should not be interpreted as im-
plying that a party assumes the risk of devaluation of a foreign ob-
ligation indefinitely. The case referred only to the risks involved
in foreign obligations prior to enforcement in a U.S. court.150 It
would be erroneous to draw from the Deutsche Bank opinion the
idea that even after a judgment is issued in the United States the
creditor still faces the risk of currency devaluation until the day
when the debtor decides to pay.
By granting an award in foreign currency, the Amoco Cadiz
decision breaks important ground. However, the court's attempt
to go beyond issuance of foreign money awards by developing
rigid rules for currency choice lacks sufficient support. Without
relevant precedent from U.S. courts on which to rely, the court
substituted economic speculation for a consideration of what best
conforms to U.S. law and best advances justice. The result does
not comport with the traditional objective of fairly compensating
the injured party or insuring that the risk of currency devaluation
falls on the wrong-doer.
5.3.2. Enforcement of an Arbitration Award in Yen: Mitsui
The only other federal case to award a sum in foreign cur-
rency is Mitsui & Co. v. Oceantrawl Corp.' This case involved
the confirmation of an international arbitration award denomi-
nated in yen. Since the award and currency were stipulated, the
only issue to be resolved was whether the judgment could be en-
forced without conversion to dollars.1 2 The court concluded that
it was not prevented from awarding a foreign money judgment.
For authority to issue a non-dollar award, the court cited the re-
peal of the Coinage Act of 1792, as well as the Amoco Cadiz deci-• 153
sion.
149 See Deutsche Bank, 272 U.S. at 517. Justice Holmes endeavored to reach
this result by adopting a judgment-day rule whereby a foreign obligation
brought in a U.S. court is converted to equivalent U.S. dollars at the judgment-
day rate, no matter the impact upon either party. See id. at 520. The purpose
was to discourage forum shopping by not rewarding a creditor for bringing
suit in the U.S. See id at 519.
150 See id
151 906 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
152 See id. at 204.
153 See id at 203.
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The court indicated agreement with the rule set out in Amoco
Cadiz, expressing the view that "[e]ntry of judgment in the cur-
rency of the parties' transactions accords with principles of fair-
ness and with the goal of making injured parties whole because it
provides them with payment in the currency for which they bar-
gained." 54 However, the decision indicated assent with the Re-
statement principle that foreign currency judgments should only
be issued "when requested by the judgment creditor, and only
when it would best accomplish the objective of making the in-
jured party whole and avoiding rewarding a debtor who has de-
layed in carrying out the obligations." 55 Though both Amoco
Cadiz and the Restatement allow for foreign currency awards,
their approach to the choice differs substantially. The Mitsui
court does not specify whether it agrees with the rigid rule of
Amoco Cadiz or favors the flexible Restatement approach. Thus,
the decision does not suggest which approach would govern fu-
ture cases.
Curiously, the court cites section 27(b) of the New York Judi-
ciary Law as support for issuing an award in yen, despite the fact
that the law goes on to require conversion into dollars using the
judgment-day conversion rate.5 6 The purpose of the reference is
made additionally unclear since the court was not sitting in diver-
sity jurisdiction, but under § 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
15 7
Thus, the Mitsui court was under no compulsion to apply New
York law.'
58
5.3. Foreign Awards in State Court
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Manches & Co. v. Gil-
bey, 159 also recognized the ability of U.S. courts to award foreign
currency judgments. The court found that "no rule of law...
bars the award of damages in Massachusetts expressed in a foreign
currency." 160  Though Massachusetts has not adopted the
UFMCA, the court authorized payment in either foreign cur-
154 Id. at 204.
155 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS 823, cmt. b, quoted in
Mitsui, 906 F. Supp. at 204.
"' N.Y. JUD. LAW § 26(b) (McKinney 1983).
157 9 U.S.C. S 9 (1994).
158 See supra Section 4.2.
159 646 N.E.2d 86, 419 Mass. 414 (Mass. 1995).




rency or in the dollar equivalent using the payment date conver-
sion rule.' 6 1 The court justified the foreign currency rule under
the principle expressed by Justice Holmes in Deutsche Bank, that
the plaintiff is not entitled to receive more than otherwise due
simply by bringing their case in a particular forum.
62
6. THE FUTURE oF FOREIGN MONEY AWARDS AND THE HOME-
CURRENCY RULE
The three recent cases issuing awards in foreign currency fail
to establish a clear rule of law. The home-currency rule followed
by U.S. courts for over a century should not be discounted be-
cause of three anomalous cases. Since its pronouncement by Jus-
tice Holmes in Hicks v. Guinness, the home-currency rule has
been doctrine. Until there is a concerted force against it among
the federal circuits or a pronouncement by the Supreme Court,
the home-currency rule will remain the guiding doctrine. Yet,
the weight of criticism and recent cases ruling to the contrary in-
dicate that a Miliangos-like revolution may be imminent.
Like the pound, the dollar's status in comparison to foreign
currencies, is not the same as it was when traditional currency-
conversion rules were formulated. 63  The changes in currency
markets and transactions have made it necessary to reexamine ba-
sic presumptions about the home-currency rule to determine what
is the best approach for the future.
6.1. The "Equitable-Lift" Solution
In order to avoid the unfairness of the breach day rule when
the forum currency declines relative to the currency of the obliga-
tion, one court has awarded a separate sum to compensate for
damages equal to the decline in value between the breach-day and
the judgment-day. 64 This method insures adequate compensation
for the plaintiff regardless of the rule applied.
161 See id. at 87-89.
162 See id. at 88-89.
163 World Trade Expanded Strongly in 1995 for the Second Consecutive Year,
Focus NEWSLETTER 2.
164 See B.V. Bureau Wijsmuller v. United States, 633 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1980)
(awarding the plaintiff an amount increased to reflect the decline in the value of
the dollar compared to the guilder).
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One commentator, Professor Brand, has proposed a similar
approach be coupled with a mandatory foreign currency rule.
6 5
Thus, all awards would be made in the currency of the obligation,
provided that if awarding a foreign currency sum results in loss to
the plaintiff due to currency fluctuation between the time of
judgment and payment, the court separately compensates the in-
jured party for these damages. This would allow the plaintiff to
benefit from the increases in the payment-day exchange rate
without risking loss from delay of payment. However, it pro-
vides little certainty to the parties who cannot easily determine
their exposure to risk.
Two significant problems arise from the equitable uplift ap-
proach. First, the concept of "nominalism"-that a plaintiff in a
civil suit may recover an additional award for interest and not any
other sum-appears to prevent such an award. 166 If the doctrine
of nominalism is applied to currency fluctuation damages, it
would prevent an adjustment to the award for currency-exchange
losses. The principle of nominalism, though applied in other
areas, might be overlooked in the foreign currency context.
168
Awarding an equitable uplift may have collateral implications by
opening the door to other forms of damages since it would erode
the principle of nominalism.
The second problem involves the lack of certainty these rules
provide to parties. Since the award amount is contingent upon
what rate favors the plaintiff, when structuring a transaction, par-
ties are prevented from appropriately gauging the actual risks in-
165 See Brand, supra note 5, at 184. He proposes an alternative to the Re-
statement which requires all judgments be renaered in the most appropriate
currency factoring i: the currency of the claim, the currency in which the loss
was felt, and the currency used by the plaintiff to pay for the loss. To compen-
sate for any harm that this might cause by devaluation, Brand provides this ad-
ditional rule: "If the currency in which the judgment is given.., has depreci-
ated in value as compared to another currency which is related to the cause of
action, a court may, in appropriate circumstances, award damages for the loss
caused by the depreciation of the judgment currency." Id
166 See Brand, supra note 5, at 185-89 (noting the history of the rule, but ar-
guing for it not to be applied in foreign currency cases); Dach,supra note 5, at
182-83 (discussing the rule and its application to foreign money claims); Note,
Conversion Date of Foreign Money Obligations, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 490, 491
(1965).
167 See Brand, supra note 5, at 186.
161 See id. at 186-88 (advocating nominialism not be applied to foreign cur-
rency conversion losses); Dach, supra note 5, at 183 (questioning whether dam-




volved.' 69 This results in terms, which when played out, may not
reflect the parties' intentions. Professor Brand's approach allevi-
ates the extent of uncertainty since the two potential rates are the
judgment-day and payment-day rate. Since the real risk of fluc-
tuation begins only after a judgment is entered, parties have
enough information about the obligation to engage in hedging in
order to offset any potential fluctuations.
170
6.2. Mandatory Foreign Judgment Rule
The court in Amoco Cadiz asserts that the currency transac-
tion should always be in the currency of judgment. This rule, as
discussed by the court, provides the highest degree of protection
against risk from fluctuation.17 ' This rigid rule, however, does
not protect the injured party in all situations. As discussed previ-
ously, a mandatory foreign currency rule could result in serious
injustice to a plaintiff in certain currency markets. 17
The Amoco Cadiz court relied too heavily on the "assumption-
of-risk" argument. The contention that parties assume the risk of
fluctuation of the currency of transaction is not supported suffi-
ciently to serve as the basis for the mandatory rule of the court.
While it is correct to assume that parties have assumed the risk of
currency fluctuation in connection with normal profits and losses
which result from carrying out a transaction, it does not necessar-
ily follow that parties, simply by agreeing to payment in a par-
ticular currency, accept the risk of currency fluctuation losses in
extraordinary circumstances, such as breach by the other party,
litigation, or unforeseeable events. The contention that the par-
ties have thereby assumed the risk for the duration of protracted
litigation or until the debtor decides to pay is questionable. 1 3 By
placing the bulk of this risk on the plaintiff, the mandatory rule
runs counter to traditional notions of fairness and also to the his-
169 See In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1329 (7th Cir.
1992l% See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
171 SeeAmoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1328; supra notes 97-98 and Section 5.1.
172 See supra notes 104, 141.
173 See Westerheim, sup-a note 1, at 1225 (arguin5 that assumption of risk
for currency fluctuation does not extend indefinite y, noting tat even an
"established course of dealing between the parties only indicates that the plain-tiff was willing to assume the risk of exchange rate fluctuation for the term of
each particular contract").
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torical objective of U.S. courts-fair compensation of the injured
party.
The UFMCA, though ostensibly offering the creditor the
choice of currency, in actuality, would work as a mandatory
rule. 174 The UFMCA's means of resolving conflicts between par-
ties as to the currency for judgment is a "currency-of-transaction"
rule, similar to the rule applied in Amoco Cadiz.'75 Any time
there has been an appreciable shift in currency values, the parties
would be motivated to prefer different currencies. Because of the
inevitable conflict, the UFMCA's default rule determines the cur-
rency to be used, regardless of any negative impact on the injured
party.
6.3. Equitable Approach
The Restatement and numerous other commentators have fa-
vored a flexible approach, applying the appropriate conversion
rule, which best compensates the plaintiff without granting either
party a windfall, this includes the foreign currency/payment-day
option.176 This requires analysis of the facts and figures of each
case to determine the most equitable solution. The chief problem
with this approach is the lack of certainty it provides parties in
both structuring a transaction and conducting litigation. Unpre-
dictable results interfere with commerce, frustrate the parties in-
tentions and drive parties to litigate in other forums. Further-
more, it frustrates hedging activities, which serve the positive goal
of protecting against currency risks.
174 See id. at 1222-23 (noting that the apparent choice in UFMCA S 6(a),
providing that "a 'person may assert a claim in a specified foreign money,'" is
"more illusory than real; "[i]f a foreign-money claim is not asserted, the claim-
ant makes the claim in United States dollars'").
'75 See UFMCA S 4.
176 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS 5823, cmt. c; Lion, supra
note 1, at 899.
177 See Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d at 1329 (emphasizing the need to respect the
parties' choice of currency); In re Good Hope Chem. Corp., 747 F.2d 806 (2d
Cir 1985) (noting the parties interest in being able to rely upon a particular
conversion rule); Brand, supra note 5, at 174 (arguing for the development of a
consistent federal common law regarding foreign currency judgments in the in-




6.4. An Empirical Approach
An empirical approach requires courts to determine what a
plaintiff intended to do with the money received under the origi-
nal agreement. If the plaintiff upon payment would have con-
verted the sum into U.S. dollars, then in order to give him the
value of what he bargained for, the breach day rate must be ap-
plied.17 8 However, if the plaintiff would have held this money in
the foreign currency, then the payment-day rate exposes the plain-
tiff to no additional risk of currency devaluation than he other-
wise would have received. 7 9 This solution prevents the plaintiff
from receiving a windfall in either case and ensures that the award
amount corresponds to the actual injury suffered by the plaintiff.
As a rule, this approach may be difficuk to enforce as it re-
quires courts to speculate about the parties' intentions. However,
as a first step, a default rebuttable presumption that the plaintiff
would convert the money into the currency of their domicile
could be utilized. 80 Thus, a company operating primarily in one
country, presumably, would convert the money into the currency
of that country and face risk of devaluation in that currency, not
the currency of transaction. This method more likely mirrors the
true nature of the parties' assumptions concerning currency
value. 181 In comparison, companies that maintain accounts with
considerable balances in the currency of the obligation could be
denied the presumption of conversion to the domicilary currency,
since they demonstrate a degree of assumption of risk in that cur-
rency. By looking at the actual financial practices of the parties,
this approach is better able to address the parties' true expecta-
tions than the Amoco Cadiz rule based upon generalized notions
of assumption of risk.
The empirical approach provides relative certainty where the
injured party has ties to only one country, but introduces consid-
erable uncertainty in dealings between multinational enterprises.
Each case would be a matter of judicial judgment with potential
large stakes since the difference would be between breach-day and
178 See Note, supra note 163, at 497.
179 See Lion, supra note 1, at 899 & nn.101-06.
180 See Note, supra note 166, at 498.
181 See Westerheim, supra note 1, at 1227; Note, supra note 166, at 498
("[S]uch an approach accords with the general expectation that nationals will
bear the risk of fluctuations in their own currency.").
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payment-day rates, opening the parties to a high level of risk and
interfering with their ability to guard against currency fluctuation
through hedging.
The virtue of the empirical method is that it comports with
the guiding principle in Anglo-American contract law: that the
injured party should be restored, as close as possible to the posi-
tion which would have resulted absent the injury. The major
fault with this approach is equally compelling; it would impede
international trade and commerce since parties would be unable
to accurately gauge their exposure to risk when dealing with mul-
tinational enterprises. A solution may be offered by combining
the principle behind the empirical approach, namely emphasis on
the currency in which the plaintiff ultimately suffered the harm,
with the certainty of a mandatory currency of obligation rule.
7. FACTORING IN THE CURRENCY OF THE HARM
Though seemingly contradictory to a currency of transaction
rule, consideration of the currency in which the plaintiff experi-
ences harm can work as one component for determining what is
the appropriate currency of judgment. The UFMCA already rec-
ognizes this by providing that the currency in which the harm is
felt can play a part in the determination of the appropriate cur-
rency. However, it goes on to indicate that this factor only
plays a marginal role.
8 4
In some situations, it is apparent that the injured party has not
assumed the risk of fluctuation in the value of the currency of
transaction or obligation. Tort cases are an obvious example. An
injured party may suffer damages denominated in foreign cur-
rency, without assuming the risk of that currency's fluctuation.
185
182 See Note, supra note 166, at 497.
183 See UFMCA § 4(a)(3).
184 See UFMCA I 4(a) (3), cmt. 2 (stating that "the three rules will normally
apply in the order stated").
185 Consider the simplistic example of a tourist injured on vacation in Eng-
land who desires compensation for medical expenses incurred in England. The
medical bill of £100 was paid out of the plaintiffs pocket at a time when the
exchange rate was £1=$1. Thus, the plaintiff has incurred a loss of $100. Once
a judgment is issued in a U.S. court for £100 and the debtor finally pays the
judgment the exchange rate is £1 = $.75. The plaintiff would then receive the
equivalent of only $75 dollars. It cannot be presumed that the injured party
assumed the risk of currency fluctuation.
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This could also occur in a breach of contract case. Suppose a
contract required payment in Mexican pesos for the convenience
of the party who eventually breached. The injured non-breaching
party kept all accounts and assets in dollars and could only obtain
remedy against the defendant in a U.S. court. In this situation, it
cannot be inferred that the injured party assumed the risk of fluc-
tuation in the currency of the contract beyond the contemplated
time span of the transaction. They only assumed the risk of fluc-
tuation during the ordinary course of the transaction. After the
completion of the contract the plaintiff intended to exchange the
pesos to dollars and risk currency fluctuation only in dollars. To
subject the innocent party to currency fluctuation risk in pesos
throughout litigation and indefinitely until the date of eventual
payment denies the plaintiff what the parties actually bargained
for, limited risk of fluctuation in the value of the peso. When it is
clear that the currency of payment is incidental to the harm and
does not truly delineate it, then it should not be applied in the in-
terest of fair compensation.
This approach does not necessarily introduce uncertainty into
commercial dealings. It need only be applied when the currency
of harm is unambiguous, such as when a party has nearly exclu-
sive dealing in one currency and would definitely have converted
any payment to a particular currency. Presumably, parties, when
structuring a transaction, would have knowledge of this factor
and could gauge ultimate risk in terms of that currency. Though
it does not facilitate hedging activities, it serves the more tradi-
tional goal of compensating the injured party without providing a
windfall and placing the risk of currency fluctuation upon the
wrong-doer. Where the injured party has substantial dealings, as-
sets, or reserves in the currency of the transaction, it appears more
evident that the parties have assumed the risk of fluctuation in
that currency of the transaction, so that equity would not demand
consideration of their domiciliary currency.
The risk of injustice to parties who have not assumed the risk
of foreign currency fluctuation requires that a mandatory cur-
rency of obligation approach be rejected. In order to assure fair
compensation to the plaintiff, consideration must be given to the
harm actually suffered by the plaintiff. Both federal and state
courts must reject mandatory home-currency or foreign-currency
rules and follow an approach which carefully weighs the impact
that a foreign currency judgment has upon a particular plaintiff to
ensure that equity is achieved.
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A mandatory home-currency or foreign-currency rule can not
achieve fair results under all situations. What appears to produce
equity during times of weak domestic currency may not produce
fair results later when the home currency is strong. Therefore,
the best approach is to look at the economic dealings of the indi-
vidual parties, not the general trend of the forum's currency when
making currency choice decisions.
8. CONCLUSION
The explosion of international trade over the last few decades
has made the issue of foreign money claims more crucial. More
trade means more contracts and inevitably more disputes. Indica-
tions are that the traditional approach of United States courts to
award amounts only in dollars is not sufficient to meet the needs
of commercial litigation. Currently, the federal courts take diver-
gent positions, ranging from a continued reliance on the home-
currency rule to calling for a mandatory currency-of-transaction
rule. States have also taken it upon themselves to provide for for-
eign currency awards when an obligation is not denominated in
dollars.
However, no consistent principles have evolved from the ad
hoc responses of the federal courts and states, which have tackled
the problem. The experiences of Great Britain since Miliangos are
instructive, but should not substitute for analysis of the demands
of traditional civil law principles. Legislatures and courts must be
careful of confusing the efficacy of foreign currency awards with
adequate compensation of the plaintiff. To accomplish this goal,
the actual harm experienced by the injured party should be the
starting point for currency choices.
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